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Abstract
Jonathan Swift famously said, “Laws are like cobwebs, which may catch small flies, but let
wasps and hornets break through.” Swift was no doubt referring to the propensity of the law to
shrink from prosecuting the lords of the realm, while going vigorously after smaller fry. But his
aphorism applies equally to issues: the more portentous the issue, the less likely it is to yield to
legal restraints. This is evidenced by such lawless pronouncements as ”international law is not a
suicide pact” or, more recently, ”I believe that all nations-strong and weak alike-must adhere to
standards that govern the use of force. I-like any head of state-reserve the right to act unilater-
ally if necessary to defend my nation.” It follows that a compilation of a large volume of laws,
treaties, regulations, and resolutions, no matter how thorough and exhaustive, from which the il-
legality of the threat and use of nuclear weapons can be deduced, will not necessarily bring about
a nuclear-weapons-free world. Indeed, the main article recognizes this dilemma by describing the
negative position of the United States, which may be characterized as ”desperately seeking Lotus.”
What is needed, therefore, is a clear, absolute, and enforceable mandate, akin to the biological and
chemical weapons conventions. It is this logic that has led to movement for a nuclear weapons
convention. This Essay will briefly describe the movement for a model nuclear-weapons conven-
tion (”MNWC” or ”Convention”) in Part I and outline its contents and discuss some issues that it
raises in Part II.
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INTRODUCTION: WTIY A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONVENTION?
The main article in this symposium' makes a strong case for
the illegality of nuclear weapons under international
humanitarian law and the rules governing the conduct of the
armed forces of the United States. Indeed, one may say that the
case is compelling, but then the question arises, whom does it
compel? Evidently not the governments of the five "official"
nuclear weapons powers-China, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States-nor the four "unofficial"
ones-India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea, not to mention
* Peter Weiss is retired from intellectual property law, but active in international,
human rights, and humanitarian law, about which he has written and lectured widely for
over half a century. The author is President of the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear
Policy, former President and current Vice President of the International Association of
Lawyers against Nuclear Arms, and Vice President of the Center for Constitutional
Rights. The author acknowledges with thanks the assistance of John Burroughs and
Jessica Erdman in the preparation of this Essay.
1. Charles J. Moxley Jr., John Burroughs & Jonathan Granoff, Nuclear Weapons and
Compliance with International Humanitarian Law and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 34
FORDHAM INT'LL.J. 595 (2011).
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others that may be working on acquiring or developing nuclear
weapons (e.g., Iran).2
Jonathan Swift famously said, "Laws are like cobwebs, which
may catch small flies, but let wasps and hornets break through."3
Swift was no doubt referring to the propensity of the law to
shrink from prosecuting the lords of the realm, while going
vigorously after smaller fry. But his aphorism applies equally to
issues: the more portentous the issue, the less likely it is to yield
to legal restraints. This is evidenced by such lawless
pronouncements as "international law is not a suicide pact"4 or,
more recently, "I believe that all nations-strong and weak
alike-must adhere to standards that govern the use of force. I-
like any head of state-reserve the right to act unilaterally if
necessary to defend my nation."5 It follows that a compilation of
a large volume of laws, treaties, regulations, and resolutions, no
matter how thorough and exhaustive, from which the illegality of
the threat and use of nuclear weapons can be deduced, will not
necessarily bring about a nuclear-weapons-free world. Indeed,
the main article recognizes this dilemma by describing the
negative position of the United States, which may be
characterized as "desperately seeking Lotus."6 What is needed,
therefore, is a clear, absolute, and enforceable mandate, akin to
the biologica 7 and chemica 8 weapons conventions. It is this logic
2. Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASSOC.,
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat (last visited Jan.
16, 2010).
3. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS: A COLLECTION OF PASSAGES, PHRASES
AND PROVERBS TRACED TO THEIR SOURCES IN ANCIENT AND MODERN LITERATURE 338b
(Emily Morison Black ed., Little, Brown and Co. 1968) (1882).
4. JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, 1 LEGITIMACY AND FORCE: POLITICAL AND MORAL
DIMENSIONS 429 (1988). Kirkpatrick was the US Ambassador to the United Nations from
1981 to 1985. Id. at xv.
5. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Nobel Lecture (Dec. 10, 2009) (transcript
available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-
lectureen.html). In accordance with current US policy, the President was presumably
also referring to preemptive war, which is of highly doubtful legality under international
law.
6. The Lotus case is a much cited and much criticized decision, holding that "[t]he
rules of law binding upon States .. . emanate from their own free will as expressed in
conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law." S.S. "Lotus"
(Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 , at 18 (Sept. 7) (emphasis added).
7. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10,
1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
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that has led to movement for a nuclear weapons convention. This
Essay will briefly describe the movement for a model nuclear-
weapons convention ("MNWC" or "Convention") in Part I and
outline its contents and discuss some issues that it raises in Part
II.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MOVEMENT FOR A NUCLEAR
WEAPONS CONVENTION
In 1996, prompted by the International Court of Justice's
advisory opinion in Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Wepaons,9
the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy ("LCNP"),1o in
collaboration with the International Association of Lawyers
against Nuclear Arms ("IALANA"), 1' International Physicians for
the Prevention of Nuclear War ("IPPNW"),12 and the
International Network of Engineers and Scientists against
Proliferation ("INESAP")'5 convened a working group charged
with drafting a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention ("MNWC").
The lawyers, doctors, scientists, and others comprising the group
met repeatedly over a period of several months. Their purpose
was not to produce a document that could per se become a
treaty, but to demonstrate that, despite the complexity of the
subject, a treaty was feasible. Hence the discussions were not
simply focused on optimal outcomes, but included sometimes
heated game playing between advocates and others taking the
roles of skeptics and naysayers.
The working group released the MNWC in April 1997 and,
at the request of Costa Rica, it became United Nations ("UN")
Document A/C.1/52/7 and was made available to all United
8. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45.
9. Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, 1 103 (July 8).
10. THE LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR POLICY INC., http://www.lcnp.org (last
visitedJan. 26, 2011).
11. THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LAWYERS AGAINST NUCLEAR ARMS,
http://www.ialana.net (last visitedJan. 26, 2011).
12. INTERNATIONAL PHYSICIANS FOR THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR,
http://www.ippnw.org (last visitedJan. 26, 2011).
13. INTERNATIONAL NETwoRK OF ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS AGAINST
PROLIFERATION, http://www.inesap.org (last visitedJan. 26, 2011).
2011] NEED FOR A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONVENTION 779
Nations ("UN") members in the six official language of the UN.14
It stirred a great deal of interest, not only among UN member
countries, but also throughout civil society. From that point
onward it generated a constant and swelling flow of calls for the
enactment of a nuclear weapons convention from government
and military officials (mostly retired),15 diplomats,16 academics,
Nobel laureates,' 7 mayors,'8 parliamentarians, 9 and civil society
organizations. 20 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon endorsed
14. Charg6 d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the U.N.,
Letter dated Oct. 31, 1997 from the Charg6 d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of
Costa Rica to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
A/C.1/52/7 (Nov. 17, 1997).
15. Many former high-level governmental officials and military officers are
supporters of Global Zero, which calls for achievement of a global agreement on
elimination of nuclear weapons. See Who Is for Zero, GLOBAL ZERO,
http://www.globalzero.org/en/who (last visited Jan. 26, 2011). For an additional
example, see Statement by Civil Leaders Calling for Negotiations on the Elimination of Nuclear
Weapons, PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT
(Aug. 6, 1998), http://www.gsinstitute.org/pnnd/CivilLeadersStatement.htm
(including Jimmy Carter, Mikhail Gorbachev, Admiral Noel Gayler, and Oscar Arias as
signatories).
16. Such as UN officials, Sergio Duarte, UN High Representative on Disarmament,
and Romeo Dallaire, former Commander of UN Forces in Rwanda. See Marian Hobbs et
al., Parliamentarians and a Nuclear Weapons Convention, PNND NOTES (Parliamentarians
for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Wellington, New Zealand) 2008, at 13,
14, available at http://www.gsinstitute.org/pnnd/pubs/PNNDCoPresNWC.pdf.
17. For a statement of Nobel peace laureates supporting negotiation of a
convention, see Breaking Down Walls for a World with Peace and justice, Summit Final
Statement, WORLD SUMMIT OF NOBEL PEACE LAUREATES (Nov. 11, 2009), http://www.
nobelforpeace-summits.org/final-conference-statement-10th-world-summit-2.
18. For example, Tadatoshi Akiba, Mayor of Hiroshima, Japan and President of
Mayors for Peace. Mayors for Peace is an association of more than 4000 cities around the
world that calls for the abolition of nuclear weapons through a global agreement. See
MAYORS FOR PEACE, http://www.mayorsforpeace.org/english/index.html (last visited
Jan. 26, 2011).
19. For example, members of the European Parliament, Michel Rocard, former
Prime Minister of France, and Jena Luc Dehaene, former Prime Minister of Belgium.
For additional information, see Members of the European Parliament Launch Support for a
Total Ban on Nuclear Weapons: Marking the 40th Anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT (July
1, 2008), http://www.gsinstitute.org/pnnd/archives/07_01_08_PREP.html. Regarding
national parliaments, see, e.g., Parliamentary Resolutions Supporting a Nuclear Weapons
Convention, PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT,
http://www.gsinstitute.org/pnnd/docs/NWCL-parliamentary-resolutions.pdf (last
visitedJan. 26, 2011).
20. Civil-society initiatives in support of a nuclear weapons convention include,
among others, the Abolition 2000 Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons, the
International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, and the Middle Powers Initiative.
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the MNWC in 2008.21 On the occasion of the quinquennial
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty22 ("NPT") Review Conference
in May 2010, twenty-eight countries specifically referred to a
nuclear weapons convention, and the Non-Aligned Movement,
representing 116 countries, strongly supported a time-bound
framework for abolition, including a convention.23 Altogether,
more than 130 states supported a convention at the conference.24
In December 2009, 124 governments, including China, India,
and Pakistan, voted for a resolution in the United Nations
General Assembly25 calling on states to immediately commence
"multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a
nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development,
production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or
use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination." 26
II. THE MODEL NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONVENTION
A revised version of the Model Nuclear Weapons
Convention ("Convention") was published in 2007.27 In
launching it as a UN document, the two sponsoring countries,
21. Ban Ki-moon, U.N. Secretary-General, Address to the East-West Institute: The
United Nations and Security in a Nuclear-weapon-Free World, (Oct. 24, 2008)
(transcript available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/
sgsm11881.doc.htm) ("I urge all NPT [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons] parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to fulfil [sic] their obligation
under the Treaty to undertake negotiations on effective measures leading to nuclear
disarmament. They could pursue this goal by agreement on a framework of separate,
mutually reinforcing instruments. Or they could consider negotiating a nuclear-weapons
convention, backed by a strong system of verification, as has long been proposed at the
United Nations. Upon the request of Costa Rica and Malaysia, I have circulated to all
United Nations Member States a draft of such a convention, which offers a good point of
departure.").
22. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
23. See TIM WRIGHT, INT'L CAMPAIGN TO ABOLISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NON-
PROLIFERATION TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE 2010: TOWARD NUCLEAR ABOLITION 2, 6
(2010), available at http://icanw.org/files/RevCon2010_1.pdf.
24. Tim Wright, Growing Support for a Nuclear Abolition Treaty, DISARMAMENT TIMES,
Summer 2010, at 6, available at http://disarm.igc.org/images/PDF/dt.2010.2.pdf.
25. U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., 55th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/64/PV.55, at 23-24 (Dec.
2, 2009).
26. G.A. Res. 64/55, 1 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/55, at 3 (Dec. 2, 2009) (emphasis in
original).
27. Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, in letter dated Dec. 17, 2007 from the
Permanent Reps. of Costa Rica and Malaysia to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/62/650 (Jan. 18, 2008) [hereinafter MNWC].
2011] NEED FOR A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONVENTION 781
Costa Rica and Malaysia, stated, "This revised model takes into
account relevant technical, legal and political developments since
1997.... It is submitted as a work in progress setting forth legal,
technical and political elements for the establishment and
maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world."28
The crux of the current version of the MNWC is Article I,
General Obligations, which prohibits the development, testing,
production, stockpiling, transfer, funding, use, and threat of use
of nuclear weapons.29 Subsequent articles require states party to
the Convention to declare all nuclear weapons, nuclear material,
nuclear facilities, and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles they
possess or control, and their locations.30 The Convention also
requires the elimination of all nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons
components, and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in five
phases, ending no later than fifteen years from its entry into
force.31
The MNWC provides for an elaborate system of verification,
including data sharing agreements, open skies, a registry,
international monitoring, on-site inspections, and, as a novel
contribution to disarmament practice, "citizen and non-
governmental reporting and protection."32 The Convention calls
for national implementation procedures, including the
enactment of necessary legislation33 and, importantly, for the
criminal prosecution of violators of the Convention.34 The
MNWC foresees the establishment of an "Agency for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons," with a Conference of the
States Parties, an Executive Council, and a Technical
Secretariat.35 There is also an Optional Protocol Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes and an Optional Protocol
Concerning Energy Assistance.36 Entry into force would occur
180 days after all nuclear weapons states, all states outside the
NPT with nuclear weapons programs, and at least forty other
28. Id.
29. Id. art. I.
30. Id. art. III.
31. Id. art. IV.
32. Id. art. V.
33. Id. art. VI.
34. Id. art. VII.
35. Id. art. VIII.
36. Id. at 72.
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states with nuclear reactors or nuclear programs have deposited
their instruments of ratification.37 Once it enters into force, the
duration of the Convention would be indefinite and withdrawal
would not be permitted.38
The above is merely a cursory summary of the MNWC's
highlights. The full text covers nineteen sections, each with
multiple paragraphs and subparagraphs.39 Any document of this
complexity is bound to raise many questions of legal sufficiency
and political reality. The drafters of the current version have
recognized this by placing certain elements in brackets, as an
indication that they themselves had difficulty agreeing on
definite numbers or clauses. However, commendably, they have
done more: they have accompanied the text with discussions of
issues raised by the entire text, as well as specifically by certain
sections or paragraphs. Some of these discussions of issues will be
presented below.4
A. Article IV Phases for Implementation
While affirming and reaffirming their commitment to an
"ultimate" nuclear-weapon-free world, the nuclear weapon states,
and the United States in particular, have maintained their
staunch opposition to a time-bound approach to achieving this
objective. Ellen Tauscher, the US Under Secretary for Arms
Control and International Security, has gone so far as to say:
Nuclear disarmament is not the Holy Grail. It's only worth
pursuing in so far as it increases our national security. I
believe that the journey on the road to zero is perhaps more
important than the goal itself. It's those concrete steps that
we take that will enhance the national security of the United
States and make the world a more stable place. 41
37. Id. art. XV.
38. Id. art. XVIll.
39. See MERAv DATAN ET AL., SECURING OUR SURVIVAL: THE CASE FOR A NUCLEAR
WEAPONS CONVENTION (2007), available at http://www.icanw.org/files/sos.pdf
(providing commentary and other background along with the full text).
40. The author of this Essay is one of the drafters of the original version and
considers self-criticism a worthy endeavor.
41. Ellen Tauscher, Under Sec'y for Arms Control and Int'l Sec., U.S. Dep't of
State, Speech to Global Zero Summit (Feb. 3, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/t/
us/136425.htm.
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Not everyone in the administration is prepared to disavow
the goal completely. President Obama, in his Prague speech, said
it might not happen in his lifetime.42 US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton, perhaps in an ill-advised attempt at humor, said the
following in addressing the State Department staffers who had
worked on the New START agreement and the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review: "I am personally very grateful for everything
you've done to move us toward our goal of a world someday, in
some century, free of nuclear weapons, but along the way, making
that world safer and safer and safer for our children and
grandchildren."4 3
The MNWC posits a maximum of fifteen years for reaching
the holy grail of a nuclear-weapons-free world, but the five phase
approach poses a number of problems. Each phase contains a
number of specific mandates, including the following:
Phase One: All nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons
delivery systems are to be de-alerted and disabled within one year
after ratification." Good, but this could still leave all nuclear
weapons and delivery systems in existence. It has been estimated
that the time required for their reassembly could be as little as a
few hours.45
Phase Two: All nuclear weapons are to be removed from
deployment sites and delivery systems are to be placed in storage
or dismantled within two years from ratification. 46 Fine, but this
would merely extend the time needed to make them operational.
Phase Three: Five years after ratification, all nuclear
weapons are to be destroyed, except up to 1000 each are to
remain in the arsenals of Russia and the United States, and one
hundred each in those of China, France, and the United
Kingdom.47
42. See Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks Delivered in Prague, Czech
Republic (Apr. 5, 2009), (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the press-office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered.
43. Hillary Clinton, U.S. Sec'y of State, Remarks to Members of the U.S. Delegation
to the New START Negotiations and Nuclear Posture Review Department Staff (July 13,
2010), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/144577.htm (emphasis
added).
44. MNWC, supra note 27, art. IV(7).
45. See Bruce Blair, Smaller and Safer A New Plan for Nuclear Postures, FOREIGN AFF.,
Sept.-Oct. 2010, at 9, 13.
46. MNWC, supra note 27, art. IV(8).
47. Id. art. IV(9).
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Phase Four: No more than fifty warheads each for Russia
and the United States, and ten each for China, France, and the
United Kingdom shall remain ten years after ratification; all
other nuclear weapons will be destroyed.48 Phase Three and
Four reflect a kind of mantra that has developed among "realist"
abolitionists who see these numbers as a giant step toward the
total elimination of nuclear weapons. But even the use of a tiny
portion of these remaining arsenals could cause death and
destruction on a scale that beggars the imagination.
Phase Five: All nuclear weapons finally are to be destroyed,
fifteen years from ratification.49
When these periods are added to the time it is likely to take
to negotiate and bring about the entry into force of the
Convention, one is looking at a very long stretch of time indeed,
during which proliferation may add to the arsenals of non-NPT
member states and may bring new states into the charmed circle
of the nuclear-armed. Needless to say, realpolitik teaches that it
may take that long, but should the planning for a nuclear
weapon free world contemplate living in a nuclear weapon full
world for fifteen, fifty, or a hundred years? Such a drawn out,
step-by-step progression may turn out to be a progression to
infinity, even if total abolition is called for at some point.
B. Article V. National Implementation Measures
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
enshrines the bedrock principle of the law of treaties: "'Pacta sunt
servanda'-Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith."50 This would
seem to make national implementation measures unnecessary.
However, this principle, bedrock or not, runs up against the
division of the world into three broad categories of states
according to their varying conceptions and practices concerning
the relationship between international and domestic or
municipal law: the so-called monist states, like France, Germany,
and the Netherlands, in which international law is self-executing
ipso facto; the so-called dualist states, like the United Kingdom
48. Id. art. IV(10).
49. Id. art. IV(11).
50. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 1.L.M. 679.
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and other members of the Commonwealth of Nations, in which
treaties, conventions, and other multistate agreements have no
force in domestic law in the absence of enabling legislation; and
hybrid states like the United States, in which some such
agreements are considered self-executing and others not,
depending on their specificity or, some would say, on the
composition of the Supreme Court at a given moment. Thus, the
requirement in Article VI(1) that each party "shall ... adopt the
necessary legislative measures to implement its obligations under
this Convention"51 may be going too far, although the universal
enactment of such legislation would be desirable if it could be
accomplished without imposing further delays on the
achievement of the Convention's goal.
C. Article VII. Rights and Obligations of Persons
Reading Article I.A.1.a and Article I.B.5.a together, it would
be a crime to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. But as of
when? If from the coming into force of the Convention, why
leave some of them in the possession of nuclear weapon states for
another fifteen years, or whatever number is agreed for Phase
Five? As for VII.A.1 and 2, these clauses provide for surrendering
persons accused of committing crimes to the International
Criminal Court ("ICC") under certain circumstances. But what if
the ICC is not willing to accept them, or if the crime, as defined
in Section I, is not within its jurisdiction? Do they go scot-free?
This lacuna could be remedied by writing an extended principle
of universal jurisdiction into the Convention, i.e., a person
accused of a crime under I.B. should be subject to the
jurisdiction of any state party to the Convention if he or she is
not tried in the state in which the crime was committed or in a
state in which the person is found, provided the latter state is
willing to extradite the person to the third party state willing and
able to prosecute. Finally, VII.13 authorizes "the agency" to
exempt from prosecution a person who admits a violation before
being notified thereof by the agency. This would invest the
agency with judicial, or at least prosecutorial, power, which would
be rather unusual.
51. MNWC, supra note 27, art. VI(1).
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D. Article VIIIAgency
Quaere whether it is a good idea to call for the establishment
of a new agency "to achieve the object and purpose of this
convention" at a time when a significant section of public
opinion throughout the world is sick of over-regulation and when
there is an agency already in place, the charter of which could be
expanded to include the function of overseeing the path to
nuclear zero. Although the International Atomic Energy Agency
has the dual purpose of preventing the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and providing NPT member states with technology for
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the former would overlap with
the functions of the new agency and the latter would not
necessarily interfere with the former. And though a nuclear
weapons-free-world would be easier to reach if "peaceful"
nuclear energy were also consigned to the wastebasket of history,
the other side of the coin is that if this were made a condition for
a nuclear weapons convention, it would make agreement on a
convention infinitely more difficult to achieve.
CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion may lead some readers to the
conclusion that the governments that pay lip service to a vision,
but do precious little to implement it, have a point: it is too
complicated, it will take too long, conditions are not ripe, etc.
But this author's purpose is just the opposite: the Model Nuclear
Weapons Convention is a bold, imaginative initiative designed to
show that if diplomats and bureaucrats will not tackle the job,
civil society will, as it has done with the mine-ban treaty52 and the
cluster-bomb treaty.5 3 The flaws in the Convention, if that is what
they are, are all the more reason to begin, not in due course, but
in the immediate present,54 the serious work of creating a
52. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056
U.N.T.S. 211.
53. Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dec. 3, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 357.
54. On December 8, 2010, the General Assembly of the United Nations, by a vote
of 133 in favor, 28 against, and 23 abstentions, adopted Resolution 65/76, which calls
upon all states "immediately" to commence "multilateral negotiations leading to an early
conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production,
testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and
providing for their elimination." U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/75 (Jan. 13, 2011).
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document that, in the words of President Kennedy, will lift the
sword of Damocles55 from the entire human race.
55. John F. Kennedy, U.S. President, Address before the General Assembly of the
United Nations (Sept. 25, 1961), (transcript available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/
Research/Ready-Reference/JFK-Speeches/Address-Before-the-General-Assembly-of-the-
United-Nations-September-25-1961.aspx.
